Nir Dagan > Research >
A note on Thomson's...
A note on Thomson's characterizations of the uniform rule
Nir Dagan
[Abstract]
[Get the full paper]
[Cited by]
Abstract
Thomson (Consistent solutions to the problem
of fair division when
preferences are single-peaked, J. Econ. Theory 63 (1994), 219-245)
proved that the uniform rule of fair division problem,
where preferences are single-peaked, is the unique rule which is
bilaterally consistent, continuous, Pareto optimal, and envy-free, in a
setting of an infinite number of potential agents. We show that the
uniqueness of the uniform rule is achieved without assuming continuity,
even in a setting of a finite number of potential agents. A similar
result is obtained by replacing envy-freeness with individual rationality
from equal division.
JEL: D63, C71.
Journal of Economic Theory 69:255-261 (1996)
Get the full paper
Cited by
- Bettina Klaus, Hans Peters and Ton Storcken,
Reallocation of an infinitely divisible good,
Economic Theory 10:305-333 (1997)
- Carmen Herrero and Antonio Villar,
The equal-distance rule in allocation problems with single-peaked preferences,
in
Ahmet Alkan, Charalambos D Aliprantis, and Nicholas C Yannelis (Eds),
Current Trends in Economics: Theory and Applications,
pp. 215-223, Springer (1999)
- William Thomson,
On the axiomatic method and its recent applications to game theory and resource allocation,
Social Choice and Welfare 18:327-386 (2001)
- Somdeb Lahiri,
Axiomatic characterizations of the CEA solution for rationing problems,
European Journal of Operational Research 131:162-170 (2001)
- Carmen Herrero,
General allocation problems with single-peaked preferences: path-independence and related topics,
Spanish Economic Review 4:19-40 (2002)
- Joe Malkevitch,
Resolving bankruptcy claims,
Feature Column, Monthly Essays on Mathematical Topics, AMS website (March 2005)
- Youngsub Chun,
The Separability Principle in Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences,
Social Choice and Welfare 26:239-253 (2006)
- Bettina Klaus,
A Note on the Separability Principle in Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences,
Social Choice and Welfare 26:255-261 (2006)
- Onur Kesten,
More on the uniform rule: Characterizations without Pareto optimality,
Mathematical Social Sciences 51:192-200 (2006)