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A Noncooperative view...
A Noncooperative view of consistent bankruptcy rules
Nir Dagan, Roberto Serrano,
and Oscar Volij
[Abstract]
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Abstract
We introduce a game form that captures a
noncooperative dimension of the
consistency property of bankruptcy rules. Any consistent and monotonic
rule is fully characterized by a bilateral principle and consistency.
Like the consistency axiom, our game form, together with the bilateral
principle, yields the corresponding consistent bankruptcy rule as a
result of a unique outcome of Nash equilibria. The result holds for a
large class of consistent monotone rules, including the Constrained
Equal Award, the Proportional Rule, and many other well known rules.
Moreover, all the subgame perfect equilibria are coalition-proof in the
associated game in strategic form.
JEL: C72 and D63.
Games and Economic Behavior 18:55-72 (1997)
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